Counterinsurgencies have been a part of state warfare since ancient times, evolving significantly during periods of colonialism and decolonization. The American Revolutionary War was a classic example of the underfunded, under-equipped, and outmanned little guy, fighting against the British Behemoth that thought it ruled the waves. The American Revolution was a classic insurgency-counterinsurgency war.
In 1831, after his death, Karl Von Clausewitz’s seminal work, On War was published by his wife. In that work he famously said:
“War is not an independent phenomenon, but the continuation of politics by different means.”
Counterinsurgency is the absolute embodiment of this famous quotation. A war is never won or lost in the fighting of it; it is won or lost by the politics of the conflict. The failure to address the politics of the conflict effectively caused the mighty British Empire to lose its American colonies. The same failure caused the mighty French Empire to be defeated by the lowly the Viet Minh in Vietnam, and the same failure caused the mighty United States to be defeated by the Viet Cong in Vietnam. In counterinsurgency warfare military power means very little. The fight pivots on the success of addressing the politics of the situation.
Fixing the Politics Trumps All Military Actions
Counterinsurgency wars involve both military and political actions aimed at defeating irregular forces (guerilla forces). More recent notable historical examples importantly include the British in Malaya after the Second World War, the U.S. failure in Vietnam, and the eventual quasi-success in the Second Iraq War, where the various political strategies working with various Muslim factions were ultimately developed to combat insurgent movements. The wisdom of addressing the politics effectively finally became the orthodox modern practice for fighting against insurgencies.
Of course the final quasi-victory in the Second Iraq War did not mitigate the foolhardiness of disrupting the fragile Middle Eastern balance of power which existed between the Iraqi state and the Iranian state. That knavish action of completely dismantling the Iraqi Ba’athist political system so weakened Iraq that it resulted in the inadvertent empowering of Iran. Empowering Iran then led indirectly to the Israeli-Palestinian War in Gaza, the subsequent 12 Days War against Iran, and the current events of the Western anti-Iranian tensions.
The Cold War Dramatically Increased Insurgencies
During the Cold War many small, developing nations were ruled by local dictators. The two first world powers competed for the allegiance of these third world nations. Hidden agents of the Communist countries often worked quietly within already disgruntled local populations to develop and empower local insurgencies which could oppose or even overthrow these dictatorships. Western intelligence services almost certainly took similar actions during that era in countries whose leaders were leaning away from the west.
Definition of an Insurgency
An insurgency is an organized movement aimed at overthrowing a government or occupying power through subversion and armed conflict. The expression guerilla warfare is derived from the French language. In French the word for war is guerre, and a little war is a petite guerre, or a guerilla. Note that the term is not gorilla warfare. The currently preferred expression for fighting by insurgent non-state actors is irregular warfare. Insurgents routinely use the unconventional tactics of guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and sabotage.
Asymmetric Warfare is the term used to describe the type of conflict where opposing forces have significantly different military capabilities or strategies, often leading to unconventional tactics used by the weaker side.
Despite the fact that the term guerilla warfare is of French origin, the French have sadly not been particularly skilled in fighting against insurgencies. That fact was clearly demonstrated in the French War in Indochina (1946 to 1954), fought against the Viet Minh insurgency which was ultimately equipped and advised by the Maoist communist People’s Republic of China. That war was, of course, the prelude to the American defeat by the subsequent Chinese-and-Russian supported Communist insurgents of the Viet Cong in our own Vietnam War.
Definition of Counterinsurgency
Counterinsurgency refers to the military and political strategies aimed at defeating insurgent movements in order to stabilize a government’s control over its sovereign territory. This approach often combines military action with efforts to win the hearts and minds of the local population. Addressing their grievances and promoting wise and charitable governance of the common people helps prevent the insurgents from being able to use the previously disenfranchised groups to further insurgent activities. Understanding counterinsurgency is essential in analyzing the complexities of modern warfare, especially during occupations where insurgent groups challenge the authority of the occupying power.
Four Key Points of a Successful Counterinsurgency Program:
1. The United States eventually employed wise and effective counterinsurgency strategies during the third phase of the Iraq War.
The first phase was the invasion. The U.S. military knew how to do that, and did it well.
The second phase was that of establishing local law and order in the subject population and that phase was severely botched. In that phase the foolish policy was the exclusion of all of the Ba’athist Party bureaucratic administrators. Those mid-level and lower-level bureaucrats had been successfully maintaining law and order in Iraq under the oppressive regime of Saddam Hussein. Most of them only joined the Ba’athist Party so they could get and keep their jobs. They were generally not philosophically Ba’athists.
Such wholesale action against the mid and lower level Ba’athist bureaucrats severely disrupted the everyday lives of most of the people in Iraq. That, in turn, stimulated numerous Muslim factions to produce disparate groups of insurgents to take up arms and fight against each other and against the occupying invaders.
That inexcusably foolhardy move caused most of the 4.495 soldiers killed and the wounds of 32,292 US combatants during the war, not to mention the roughly 200,000 Iraqi civilian deaths.
2. The most important element in the counterinsurgency program in Iraq was the eventual realization by the US commanders that the real fight was to win the hearts and minds of the various divergent groups who populated Iraq. A strategy that emphasizes gaining support from the local population through positive engagement and addressing their needs is critical. Solely relying on military force is counterproductive to success.
3. Counterinsurgency operations often face criticism for their effectiveness, as the military “policing actions” which must be performed can sometimes lead to increased resentment among the local population.
4. Success in counterinsurgency relies on a deep understanding of the local culture, politics, and social dynamics to tailor approaches that resonate with the affected communities. Regaining the support of the disenfranchised people or peoples is the end goal. Incorporating the marginalized groups and factions of the endangered nation’s society is the essence of a counterinsurgency program.
Generally speaking, the military knows how to fight against the bad guys. It’s the political leaders who must learn to help those who have be previously been marginalized and disaffected that is the harder part of winning the counterinsurgency campaign.
Conclusions
Throughout history, insurgencies have challenged conventional military tactics and political stability, prompting the development of complex counterinsurgency strategies. Understanding these lessons from history offers vital insights into effective conflict resolution and state security.
Right now in America, in a very real sense the disruptive actions of highly organized and well-funded groups in America like Antifa and the shadowy extreme leftist arms of the Democratic Party are a current day insurgency. They seek to cause social disruption by any means possible.
The lessons discussed above tell us that the concerns of large groups of left-leaning follower factions need to be addressed successfully, and in depth. The associated law enforcement and police actions need to be directed at the far-left insurrectionist leadership faction which is currently working hard to rabble rouse the follower factions who have legitimate concerns.
The principles of counterinsurgency programs discussed above are not as esoteric as they may at first look. Understanding this historical context reveals patterns and lessons applicable in current conflicts.
Suggested Additional Reading for the interested:
The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya, produced under the direction of the Director of Operations, Malaya, published by The Naval & Military Press, Ltd. – 1958
Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice by David Galula – 1964
The Accidental Guerrilla Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One by David Kilcullen – 2009
A History of Counterinsurgency by Gregory Fremont – Barnes, Editor, Volume 1 – From South Africa to Algeria, 1900 to 1954 & Volume 2 – From Cyprus to Afghanistan, 1955 to the 21st Century – 2015
- 01 – Strange Bedfellows – Modern Authoritarian Governments Aiding the Common People
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